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ABSTRACT 
 
We summarise salient developments in the interaction of the 
multilateral trading system and multilateral trading agreements (MTAs) on the 
one hand and regional trading agreements (RTAs) on the other. We then 
consider the economic effects of RTAs, comparing customs unions with free 
trade agreements. We argue, contrary to much received wisdom, that either 
may produce more economic benefits than the other, depending on the 
specific context in which they are introduced. There follows a discussion of 
the political economy effects of RTAs. Some of these have unfavourable, 
some neutral and some favourable effects on the progress of further MTAs. 
We conclude that the case against RTAs as eroding the MTS and inhibiting 
further MTA negotiations, as expounded by such economists as Krueger and 
Bhagwati, is not well founded. There remain grounds for optimism that the 
process of competitive liberalisation in RTAs will lead eventually to further 
multilateral liberalisation.  
 
KEY WORDS: customs unions, free trade areas, multilateral 
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MULTILATERAL VERSUS REGIONAL TRADING 
ARRANGEMENTS:  
SUBSTITUTES OR COMPLEMENTS? 
In recent years, there has been much debate about the advantages and 
disadvantages of the proliferation of Regional Trading Arrangements (RTA), both 
customs unions (CUs) and free trade areas (FTAs). The key question that we ask in 
this chapter, whether multilateral and regional trade liberalisation initiatives are  
substitutes or complements, raises issues concerning both the economic and political 
economy effects of RTAs. As with most real world policy issues, these are second 
best issues in which context matters: the initial starting position and the subsequent 
evolutionary dynamics affect both the immediate economic balance of trade creation 
and trade diversion and the longer term political economy implications for the 
multilateral trading system (MTS) ─ a system that has developed over the sixty five 
years since the launch of the Bretton Woods post war trade and payments system.  
The economic advantages and disadvantages of RTAs are quite well known. 
However, some economists, Cooper and Massel (1965) in particular, have been 
sceptical about their benefits, arguing that any advantage that is conferred on a 
country by an RTA could be obtained much easier by a unilateral reduction of its 
tariffs. The Wonnacotts in their paper in this volume refute this view by considering 
the gains to export industries that arise from RTAs but are not available from 
unilateral tariff reductions. We consider their analysis later in our paper explaining 
why this leads us to accept the traditional view that RTAs cannot be judged as being 
either beneficial or harmful in general. Instead, each case must be judged on its own 
merits by balancing its context-specific economic advantages against its context-
specific disadvantages.  
Compared with the large volume of work on the economic effects of FTAs, 
there has been much less analysis of the political economy effects. Do they have a 
positive or a negative effect on the Multilateral Trading System (MTS)? At one 
extreme, some economists argue that these effects are unambiguously unfavourable. 
Anne Krueger (1997a, 1997b, 1999a, 1999b) argues that RTAs change the political 
economy of the participating countries by reducing their willingness to engage in 
subsequent multilateral trade liberalization. Bhagwati (2008) sees a systemic threat to 
the non-discrimination principle that is central to the MTS. He fears that this principle 
is being eroded by the recent proliferation of RTAs. He is particularly concerned 
about overlapping FTAs involving countries in different parts of the world and the 
costs of multiple rules of origin (ROO). He has colourfully expressed his worries by 
saying that RTAs are termites relentlessly eating away at the multilateral trading 
system. A middle position is taken by Baldwin (this volume) who sees regionalism as 
here to stay, even if it is an untidy way to organize trade. He then goes on to suggest 
reforms to multilateralise regionalism. At the other extreme, Scholtt (1989) and 
Lipsey and Smith (1989) argued that the political economy effects of RTAs were on 
balance favourable.  
The remarkable proliferation of regional agreements in the period since the 
creation of the WTO in 1995 while the multilateral Doha negotiations in the WTO 
remained stalled (as of 2009) might be thought to support Krueger and Bhagwati ’s 
political economy pessimism. However, we see no compelling arguments that these 
effects are unambiguously unfavourable. One possibility is that the existence and 
creation of many regional RTAs reduces the chance of success of the Doha and other 
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similar future rounds by reducing the RTA members’ interest in reaching multilateral 
agreements.  A second possibility is that the problems of the Doha round may be 
mainly those of reaching agreement among 153 WTO member nations with diverse 
and often conflicting agendas. If so, the existence of a plethora of RTAs may be 
irrelevant to the success of the Doha and other similar multilateral rounds. There is a 
third possibility: the political economy dynamic of RTAs may be favourable. In 
particular: (i) a few member countries with common interests may be able to negotiate 
more economic gains under a RTA than many countries with diverse interests can 
accomplish within the WTO, and these may even point the way to deeper multilateral 
integration; (ii) internal pressures within an RTA may work towards increasing trade 
liberalization among the members, compared with what was established in the 
original agreement; (iii) internal pressures may work towards further external trade 
liberalisation through initiatives by RTA partners to negotiate the formation of further 
RTAs with other partners, to engage in multilateral negotiations, or to undertake 
unilateral liberalisation; (iv) external pressures can even contribute to increasing 
incentives for multilateral liberalisation by prodding reluctant parties to join in 
multilateral negotiations. 
In this chapter, we first survey the relevant history of both multilateral and 
regional liberalising efforts. We then go on to consider the economic effects of RTAs, 
taking issue with the view that customs unions are unambiguously economically 
superior to  free trade areas. This is followed by a discussion of the political economy 
effects in which we study forces set up by FTAs that are unfavourable, neutral or 
favourable to the progress of further multilateral liberalisation. Here we conclude that 
the case against RTAs as inhibiting multilateral negotiations is not well founded. The 
chapter ends with a short section containing summary and conclusions.  
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL EVOLUTION 
We begin with a brief summary of salient developments in the trading system, 
starting with the current context and then reflecting on its historical evolution. In this, 
the multilateral and regional negotiating processes and the outcomes have mutually 
interacted. An assessment of the interaction of RTAs and the MTS needs to take this 
historic evolution into account. 
The Current Context 
Since the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, RTAs 
have proliferated. Some 421 RTAs have been notified to the GATT/WTO since the 
creation of the GATT in 1947 up to December 2008 of which about 230 agreements 
remained in force at that date. Of these, 324 RTAs were notified under Article XXIV 
of the GATT 1947 or GATT 1994; 29 under the Enabling Clause; and 68 under 
Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) under the WTO.  
About twice as many RTAs have been notified to the WTO since 1995 as compared 
to all the RTAs notified to the GATT from 1947 up to 1994. Fiorentino’s paper in this 
volume examines this data in more detail. 
Many RTAs have been announced or are under negotiation at the present time. 
If we take into account RTAs which are in force but have not been notified, those 
which are signed but not yet in force, those which are currently being negotiated, and 
those which are in the proposal stage, we arrive at a figure of close to 400 RTAs 
which are scheduled to be implemented by 2010. Of these RTAs, free trade 
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agreements and partial scope agreements (PSAs) account for over 90%, while 
customs unions account for less than 10 %. (The box gives definitions of the relevant 
terms.) 
 
[TEXT BOX] 
TYPES OF TRADE AGREEMENTS 
Customs Union (CU): A regional agreement which removes internal tariffs on 
substantially all trade and establishes a common external tariff in accordance with 
GATT Article XXIV.  
Free Trade Agreement (FTA): A regional agreement in which the members 
retain separate commercial policies for trade with third countries but remove tariffs 
and other restrictions from substantially all trade with their partners for products 
meeting the agreement’s rules of origin in accordance with GATT Article XXIV. 
Partial Scope Agreement (PSA): An agreement providing for reduction and/or 
elimination of duties on a limited number of products and thus not in accord   with 
Article XXIV.  Partial scope agreements are allowed under the GATT/WTO Enabling 
Clause but only for developing countries.  
 ________________________________________________________ 
The proliferation of RTAs creates a complex trading regime simply because 
there are so many agreements with many overlapping memberships.  Until recently, 
regional arrangements were among groups of contiguous countries such as the 
Benelux customs union which foreshadowed the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and the NAFTA.  Since the formation of the WTO in 1995, not only has the 
number of such RTAs expanded, but many countries have initiated FTAs with 
countries in regions, or even continents, other than their own. For example, Singapore 
not only has FTAs with the other members of ASEAN, -- Brunei, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam --, but also 
with Australia, Chile, China, India, Japan, Jordan, Korea, New Zealand, Peru, the 
United States, and The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) which includes 
Switzerland, Iceland and Norway. Although Singapore is exceptional, many countries 
have entered into bilateral FTAs outside their own geographic region or continent. 
A Brief Historical Overview1 
It is useful to put this current situation into historical context since the debate 
about multilateralism versus bilateralism or regionalism is a product of post-war era. 
Although there had been Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trade treaties in the 19th 
century up until the First World War, it is only after the Second World War that there 
was anything that could reasonably be called a formal multilateral trading system. 
The First Wave of Globalisation 
Before the First World War, the payments system was anchored by the gold 
standard and the dominant role of the British economy with the Bank of England as 
                                                
1 See Diebold (1988) for a superb essay on the history of the multilateral trading system and the role of 
the U.S. from the 1850s to the 1980s.  
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the guarantor and lender of last resort. There was no formal multilateral trading 
system as such with common rules, but the series of bilateral MFN treaties created a 
form of multilateral regime for tariffs which were the main instrument of trade 
protection. The lack of an internationally agreed set of rules for these treaties was a 
source of problems because the MFN treaties led to numerous disputes and were often 
revoked. For example, the Cobden Chevalier treaty between Britain and France, 
which was regarded as a breakthrough in 1860, was revoked by France with the 
protectionist “Meline” tariffs thirty years later.  There were also difficulties since key 
economies, notably Germany and the United States became increasingly assertive and 
aggressive in trade policies in the late 19th century. The United States emerged from 
the Civil War with high tariffs on manufactures and the tariffs were increased until the 
McKinley Tariff of 1890. Germany increased its agricultural protection and protected 
many infant manufacturing industries after 1878. The United States revoked the MFN 
treaty with Germany in the 1890s and a trade war almost erupted between the two 
countries over preferences granted by the US to Cuba. Several European countries 
and the United States adopted a “conditional” MFN approach, which meant that MFN 
was only extended through further bilateral negotiations and not automatically as the 
treaties stated. This ”conditional” approach undercut the fundamental principle of 
MFN.  Also as Viner (1950) noted, the principle of MFN was often evaded by the 
trick of making small distinctions in the tariff lines for similar products in order to 
discriminate among trading partners in the duty rates. 
The Interwar Period 
The interwar period was beset by payments problems and macroeconomic 
instabilities. These were reinforced by a collapse of efforts to negotiate trade 
cooperation and a resulting slide into protectionism. Notable in this development was 
the enactment of the Smoot Hawley tariff in the United States in 1930. This led to 
retaliatory tariffs and other restrictions such as quotas imposed by many countries in a 
combination of retaliation and emergency balance of payments measures, all of which 
aggravated the downward spiral of a global depression. Subsequently, the resulting 
economic chaos of the Great Depression induced the United States Congress to grant 
the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, negotiating authority in the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act of 1934. In the period 1935-1939, the process of dismantling the 
tariffs was begun when the U.S. negotiated several bilateral trade agreements, which 
were extended to other trading partners through MFN clauses. MFN agreements were 
concluded with Britain, Canada, Cuba and several other Latin American countries. 
The 1935 agreements with Britain and Canada were renegotiated and expanded in 
1939. This process was ended by the onset of World War II.  
The Post-War Bretton Woods 
At the end of the Second World War, policymakers conceived the Bretton 
Woods system with the International Monetary Fund to foster macroeconomic 
stability, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to finance the 
rebuilding of the war-shattered economies, and a proposed new International Trade 
Organization (the ITO) to govern trade. While the ITO was under negotiation, the 
trading rules in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were negotiated 
and accepted on an interim basis by a small group of countries. The ITO foundered 
because it was rejected by the US Senate so that the GATT continued for almost five 
decades with a steady accretion of member countries. 
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The GATT rules as agreed in 1947 provided for RTAs either in the form of 
customs unions or free trade areas. However, these were viewed as primarily of 
interest to small groups of contiguous countries, such as those in the Benelux customs 
union that linked Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. In the 1950s, interest in 
RTAs increased with negotiations that led to the formation of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) by Belgium, France, West Germany, Holland, Italy, and 
Luxembourg launched in 1958. Subsequently, the European Free Trade Association 
was established in 1960 by Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom who wished to benefit from freer trade but did 
not wish to accept all the other conditions of what was then the EEC.  
Under the GATT there were six successive rounds of multilateral negotiations 
focused on progressively reducing the high tariffs of earlier decades. Starting from 
1947 until the Kennedy Round in 1967, negotiations were conducted on a bilateral 
request-and-offer basis with the country that was the principal supplier of a particular 
product to the importing country normally taking the lead. There was an effort to 
balance the values of trade covered by tariff concessions in any two countries 
agreeing to a bilateral set of reductions. For example, Britain would cut tariffs on 
wine if France cut tariffs on whiskey. Although this bargaining process had a 
mercantilist aspect and has been called “mercantilist bargaining,” the results of the 
bilateral negotiations were included in MFN tariff concessions extended to all other 
GATT members. Although the process of reciprocal negotiations was viewed with 
scepticism by some economists (e.g., Johnson (1965)), the results cumulated over the 
decades to a major liberalising of trade over particularly in manufactured goods. The 
Wonnacotts writing in this volume consider this issue in more detail.  
As more countries participated in GATT negotiations, this bilateral bargaining 
became increasingly complex. As a result, tariff negotiations were altered somewhat 
in the Kennedy Round. A tariff reduction formula was first agreed and was then 
supplemented by bilateral bargaining, the results of which were extended to all 
members on an MFN basis. In their paper in this volume, the Wonnacotts draw on 
their earlier work to show that negotiators could have been seeking to balance the 
potential terms of trade gains from the removal of foreign barriers.  
Although some economists such as Johnson (1965), did not see a rationale for 
this bargaining technique, it has more recently been viewed as a response to the “free-
rider” problem of MFN tariff negotiations.  Finger (1979) provides evidence that in 
the first six GATT rounds (1947-1967), the U.S. was more inclined to bargain 
reciprocal tariff cuts with counties that had participated in the negotiations than with 
those that had not participated.  
The focus on reciprocal concessions meant that these tariff negotiations were 
mainly among developed countries. However, once the negotiations were concluded 
for each round, all the tariff schedules were “bound” as GATT commitments and 
made available to all GATT members. Developing countries were allowed to be ‘free 
riders’ in that they received the benefits of MFN tariff reductions but were not 
expected to make significant tariff concessions themselves. One unfortunate 
consequence of this arrangement was that MFN tariff reductions by developed 
countries did not focus on products of major interest to developing countries since 
they were not active participants in the negotiations.  
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Tokyo Round 
The Tokyo Round tariff negotiations in the 1970s were concluded on a similar 
basis to earlier rounds with few commitments by developing countries and with 
developed countries making tariff reductions in products of interest to their key 
trading partners in other developed countries. Developing countries were focused on 
retaining preferential access to developed country markets, such as the General 
System of Preferences (GSP), which had been available previously only by time-
limited waivers from the general rule of MFN.2 
By the time of the Tokyo Round, with about 90 members in the GATT, 
developed countries had become concerned about the MFN free-rider problem, the 
widespread use of non-tariff barriers to trade, and the convoy” problem ─ trade 
negotiations moving at the speed of the most reluctant countries just as convoys 
moved at the speed of the slowest ship. The tariff negotiations were conducted on an 
MFN basis as before but new rules concerning non-tariff barriers were negotiated on a 
different plurilateral basis with smaller groups of countries volunteering to take on the 
obligations. The latter approach produced a series of plurilateral agreements or 
“codes” on non-tariff barriers where participation was open to the likeminded 
countries that were willing to accept the same obligations on rules for non-tariff 
barriers. These Tokyo Round codes on non-tariff barriers included agreements on:  
· Subsidies and countervailing measures  
· Technical barriers to trade  
· Import licensing procedures  
· Government procurement  
· Customs valuation  
· Anti-dumping  
· Bovine Meat Arrangement  
· International Dairy Arrangement and  
· Trade in Civil Aircraft  
Developing countries were sceptical about the “codes” and blocked the 
creation of new rules permitting selective safeguards which were contrary to the 
GATT principle that safeguards for import surges needed to be applied on an MFN 
basis. The negotiating quid pro quo for permitting the plurilateral codes to be 
negotiated that was obtained by developing countries was the 1979 “Enabling 
Clause.” This provided much more flexibility for Regional Integration Arrangements 
(RIAs). The RIAs included RTAs, some broad preference schemes to promote South-
South trade among developing countries and also provided more latitude for 
preferential access by developing countries to developed country markets.  
                                                
2 The General System of Preferences arose out of the debate concerning the New Economic Order in 
the 1960s and permitted the developed countries to provide preferential tariff rates for products 
imported from developing countries.  
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Uruguay Round 
The 1980s were fractious times in international trade relations. After the 
collapse of the GATT ministerial in 1982, the Uruguay Round of negotiations was 
launched in 1986 with some difficulty and the negotiations were protracted. 
Successive deadlines for completing the negotiations were missed. Yet despite the 
difficulties, the negotiations became more ambitious over time.  
These negotiations faced many of the difficulties that the Doha negotiations 
have encountered subsequently. Although developing countries had always resisted 
taking on obligations and making tariff concessions in the GATT, they were full 
participants in the Uruguay Round negotiations. As a result, it proved difficult 
conclude these complex multi-issue negotiations with a very large group of 
participating countries. In this context, the willingness of the United States to 
negotiate free trade agreements provided a prod to other countries to negotiate 
multilaterally. Paradoxically a  rising threat of protectionism in the United States, a 
resurgence of US unilateralism in the form of threatened trade retaliation, and a shift 
to more open markets in many countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union were 
all factors that contributed to the eventual successful conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round.  
The results of the Uruguay Round negotiations, which led to the creation of 
the WTO in January 1995, limited greatly, and sometimes eliminated, the ability of 
countries to use various exceptions to the GATT 1994 (the original GATT terms as 
amended in the Uruguay Round) under the WTO as compared with the GATT 1947. 
For example, various exceptions to the GATT 1947 rules that guarantee non-
discrimination and prohibit quantitative restrictions, are precluded by the WTO under 
the GATT 1994 rules. In addition, sectors such as agriculture and textiles, which had 
special rules that permitted trade restrictions and/or export subsidies, were 
reintegrated into the system of the WTO’s normal trade rules. The WTO also 
incorporated new rules for trade in services, including investment under the General 
Agreement for Trade in Services (GATS) and intellectual property rights, as well as 
establishing a strengthened and integrated dispute settlement mechanism, which 
applies to the agreements for trade in goods, trade in services and trade related 
intellectual property rights.  
Trade Liberalization under the WTO 
Although it has proved very difficult to bring the Doha multilateral 
negotiations to a conclusion, there has been a significant liberalization of trade in the 
WTO since 1995. This has occurred through several modalities as follows: 
· At the first WTO ministerial in Singapore, there was a successful 
negotiation of the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), which 
eliminated tariffs on a large number of computer and telecommunications 
products for many WTO member countries.  
· There were negotiations on financial services and telecommunications 
under the GATS, which resulted in significant liberalization, However, 
these were essentially a completion of unfinished business left over from 
the Uruguay Round and were driven in part by some major countries 
refusing to extend access benefits (MFN exceptions) in this sector until 
the offers were improved. 
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· There were transition provisions in the WTO agreements and in the 
schedules of commitments from the Uruguay Round that have been 
implemented over time. 
· Many dispute settlement cases have led to many countries fulfilling their 
obligations and commitments.  
· The 25 countries that have acceded to the WTO since 1995 have 
liberalized their trade regime through accepting all WTO obligations and 
making extensive liberalisation commitments in their schedules for trade 
in goods and services. China is the largest of these economies. 
· There was a significant agreement at the launch of the Doha Round in 
2001 by developed countries to grant what is called ‘Duty Free and Quota 
Free Access’ to the least developed countries on most of their exports 
without reciprocal reductions. Most developed countries including the 
European Union (EU), the US, Japan and Canada,3 have acted on this 
commitment.   
 Although the WTO has achieved a significant degree of liberalization of trade 
in goods and services from its inception until the present, much of the liberalization 
that has occurred has resulted from the accession of new members such as China, and, 
as the list above indicates, from the implementation of WTO obligations and 
commitments from the Uruguay Round, and from services negotiations associated 
with unfinished business from the Uruguay Round. As far as new commitments are 
concerned, there have been substantial difficulties in bringing the Doha multilateral 
negotiations to a successful conclusion. So far, the only example of a successful 
multilateral tariff negotiation in the WTO is the ITA in 1996. We will examine this 
case below in more detail in considering the political economy of multilateral and 
regional negotiations.  
Regional and Preferential Agreements under the GATT/WTO 
The principle of Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment was one of the key 
elements of the GATT 1947 and was incorporated in Article I.  In part, the architects 
of the GATT hearkened back to the system of MFN treaties in the 19th century.  More 
importantly, the economic and political success in the midst of the Great Depression 
of the negotiation of bilateral MFN treaties under the U.S. Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Program of Cordell Hull was the direct inspiration for the negotiation of 
the GATT.  
The Protocol of Provisional Application 
Since MFN was a cornerstone of the GATT, only two exceptions were 
permitted under the GATT 1947. First, under the Protocol of Provisional Application, 
existing preferential tariff arrangements such as the British Preferential System and 
the French Union were “grandfathered.”  These systems were regarded as anomalies 
and the existing margins of preference were not to be raised. It was anticipated that 
these would be reduced through future multilateral negotiations in the GATT, and that 
proved to be the case. The remaining “grandfathered” arrangements were eliminated 
with the creation of the WTO.  
                                                
3 The countries are listed In order according to the value and volume of such imports. 
13 
 
Article XXIV 
Second, Article XXIV of the GATT provided for an exemption from MFN 
covered in Article I of the GATT as well as other GATT articles, for CUs and FTAs. 
In both cases, the requirements are that the members of a regional agreement should 
form, “within a reasonable period of time,”  an arrangement such that “duties and 
other restrictive regulations of commerce…are eliminated on substantially all the 
trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such territories”4.  
The Enabling Clause 
Later, a third exception was added by the Tokyo Round. The 1979 Decision 
on “Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation 
of Developing Countries” ("1979 Enabling Clause") provides permission for 
generalized tariff preferences by developed countries in favour of developing 
countries and for regional trade arrangements among developing countries without 
meeting the requirements of Article XXIV. The latter element permits partial scope 
agreements among developing countries.  
II. ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS OF RTAs   
To consider both the economic and the political economy effects of 
multilateral and regional trade agreements, we need first to compare mutual tariff 
reductions that take place in either RTAs or MTAs with unilateral tariff reductions 
(UTRs).5 In their paper in this volume, the Wonnacotts criticise the widespread view 
that unilateral tariff reductions can accomplish  everything that can be accomplished 
by reciprocal tariff reductions. Against this view, they argue that the gains from being 
able to export more are in addition to the gains from increasing imports of products 
that can be obtained from abroad at a lower real cost than they can be produced at 
home. These enhanced export gains arise from at least two important sources.  
The first is changes in the term of trade. Even a small county trading at fixed 
international prices in foreign markets suffers a reduction in its terms of trade when 
others levy a tariff on one of its products. This is because the foreign tariff forces the 
export price down by the amount of the tariff in order to sell in the foreign market at 
the given foreign price. This transfers some the gains from trade to the country 
levying the tariff. Thus, a reduction in the foreign tariff transfers some of these gains 
back to the producing country, even if its exports remain unchanged. The second is 
the ability to exploit economies of scale in various lines of a differentiated product 
about which we have much more to say later. For a full analysis, see the Wonnacotts’ 
article in this volume where they refute the view that  all gains that can be obtained 
through reciprocal negotiations can be also gained by UTR.  
Customs Union Theory 
The classic customs union theory of Viner (1950) and Meade (1955) assumed 
Ricardian technology with fully constant costs leading to perfectly elastic supply 
curves of standardized commodities produced under conditions of perfect 
                                                
4  The quote is from Article XXIV 8(b) of the GATT 1947, which applies to FTAs, but the language of 
Article XXIV 8(a) for CUs closely parallels this language (GATT Secretariat 1994).   
5 In their article in this volume, the Wonnacotts refer to these as RTR, MTR, and UTR respectively. 
14 
 
competition, hereinafter called ‘the Ricardian case’. (See Lipsey (1960) for a review 
of this theory.) It then focussed on the welfare effects of the trade creation and trade 
diversion that accompany the shifts in production caused by the formation of a CU. 
The analysis also applies, with necessary corrections, to free trade areas.  
To summarise the possibilities, consider two countries A and B and one 
product, X, for which A has the highest costs of production, B the next highest and the 
rest of the world, C, the lowest. As is typical with the Ricardian case , there is water 
under the tariff ─ the domestic price is lower than the foreign price plus the tariff. 
(We consider this assumption in detail later but for now we just note it is typical of 
the genuine constant cost case unless tariff rates are carefully chosen just to protect 
each industry and no more.) Let A and B form a CU. The various possible pre-CU 
tariffs give rise to five possible cases, assuming that A’s pre-union tariff is always 
greater than B’s and that the post-union tariff rate on X lies somewhere between the 
two country’s pre-union rates.6  
Case 1: Tariffs in both A and B are high enough to protect domestic industries 
producing X.  After the  CU is formed, there is trade creation with B capturing the 
whole union market.7 
Case: 2: B’s tariff is high enough to protect a domestic X industry while A’s is 
not. Before the CU is formed, A is importing X from C but afterwards A buys its X 
from B in a case of trade diversion.8 
Case 3: A’s (very high) tariff protects its domestic X industry while B’s (much 
lower) tariff does not protect its X industry. Before the CU, B imports X from C while 
A produces X under tariff protection. There are now three sub-cases depending on the 
level of the post-union tariff.9  
Case 3a: The common post-union tariff protects the X industry in neither A 
nor B. This case gives rise to trade creation as A now buys X from the lowest cost 
foreign producer, C, rather than producing it at home.10  
Case 3b: The common tariff is high enough to protect the X industry in B but 
not in A. This produces a mixed case. There is trade diversion as B now produces X at 
home rather than buying it from C. There is trade creation because A buys its X from 
B rather than producing it at home and although B is a higher cost producer of X than 
C, it is a lower cost producer than A.11 
Case 3c: The common tariff is high enough to protect the X industry in both A 
and B. The results are the same as in Case 3b. Although the tariff is high enough to 
protect the X industry in both A and B, the lower cost B producers will capture the 
                                                
6 As these cases can become confusing, it may help to outline each in symbols. Let the price of X in 
each country be equal to full cost and symbolized by pa, pb and pc; let the specific tariff on X in each 
country be ta, tb and tc and let the post union common tariff be tu.  The basic cost assumptions are pc< 
pb < pa. 
7 Case 1: pb < pa < (pc +tb) < (pc + tu) (pc + ta).  
8 Case 2: pb < (pc + tb) < (pc + tu) < (pc + ta)  < pa. 
9 Case 3 (and 3’): (pc + tb) < pb < pa < (pc + ta).  
10 Case 3a: (pc + tb) < (pc + tu)< pb < pa < (pc + ta). 
11 Case 3b: (pc + tb) < pb < (pc + tu) < pa < (pc + ta). 
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whole union market. So there is trade creation with respect to the new A-B trade and 
trade diversion with respect to the elimination of imports of X into B.12  
Case 4: Tariffs in both A and B are not sufficiently high to protect domestic 
industries in either country but A’s tariff is high enough to protect B’s X industry in 
A’s market. Now the outcome depends on where the common post CU tariff rate is 
set.  
Case 4a: If the common tariff is set at or near the high extreme of A’s tariff, 
trade diversion occurs as the source of X for both A and B shifts  from C to B.  
Case 4b: If it is set at or near the low extreme of B’s tariff, that leaves neither 
country with a protected X industry so the CU has no affect on the pattern of trade in 
X.13 
Case 5: Tariffs in both A and B are not sufficiently high to protect domestic 
industries in either country and the post union tariff on X is not high enough to protect 
B ‘s industry. Now both partners continue to buy X from C so the CU has no affect on 
the pattern of trade in X.14      
In addition to the effects of these reallocations of production are effects both 
from possible changes in partners’ terms of trade analysed by the Wonnacotts and 
discussed above and the reallocation of consumption analysed by Lipsey and 
Lancaster (1957: Section 5,”A problem in the theory of customs unions”) who used 
these effects as an illustration of the general theory of second best.  Earlier Lipsey 
(1957a, 1957b) had shown that the reallocation of consumption following a 
preferential removal of some tariffs can sometimes bring sufficient gain to outweigh 
the harmful effects of some significant amount of trade diversion. Lipsey (1970: 97-
99) also showed that although these effects can be either favourable or unfavourable, 
they were more likely to be favourable the higher the proportion of total foreign trade 
that was done with the country’s union partners (not surprising) and the higher the 
ratio of domestic trade to imports from non-partner countries, the volume of trade 
with partners being irrelevant ceteris paribus (perhaps a surprising result).15 
Nonetheless, consumption effects are usually ignored in the evaluation of trade 
policies. This may be because producers have more concentrated interests than 
consumers or just that production effects are more visible and easier to calculate than 
consumption effects. 
So far we have examined production effects from the perspective of the 
“Ricardian” case following the classical approach.  There are other technology and 
market structures to consider.  
One such case is the case with homogeneous commodities, constant returns to 
scale and perfect competition where the aggregate supply curve is upward sloping due 
to a fixed factor or economy wide supply constraints. We consider this case later.  
                                                
12 Case 3c: (pc + tb) < pb < pa < (pc + tu) (pc + ta). 
13 Case 4a: (pc + tb) <  pb<  (pc +tu) < (pc + ta) < pa and Case 4b: (pc + tb) < (pc+tu)< pb< (pc + ta) < pa   
14 Case 5: (pc + tb) < (pc + tu) < (pc + ta) < pb <pa. 
15 Lipsey isolated the consumption effect by studying the case in which a small country is specialized 
in the production of  a single commodity whose production is unchanged when a union is formed. In 
this case, the union’s only effect is to cause a reallocation of consumption when some tariffs are 
removed. 
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Another case is that of product differentiation and economies of scale in 
production, which give rise to either monopolistic competition or oligopolistic market 
structures. Many product groups are characterised by this structure. Again this case 
will be considered later. Product differentiation and scale economies create the 
potential for pro-competitive and scale effects from regional or multilateral 
integration. 
Comparison of Customs Unions and FTAs 
Until this point, we have been analysing some of the economic effects of CUs. 
Next we compare customs unions with FTAs. We continue for the moment to make 
Ricardian assumptions and consider the previous example, this time with an FTA 
rather than a CU.  
The continuation of the different pre-union tariff rates against C in both A and 
B after the FTA is formed has no effect on cases 1, 2, 4b  and 5.  However, the 
customs union cases 3 and 4a are different and we call their FTA manifestations cases 
3’ and 4a’.   
In case 3’, A’s tariff is high enough to protect a domestic X industry but B’s 
(much lower) tariff is not. Thus before the FTA is formed, B imports X from C while 
A produces it at home under its very high tariff rate. After the FTA, A’s unchanged 
tariff remains high enough to keep C’s X out of its market but B’s X, which has a 
lower cost of production than A’s X, will capture A’s market. Thus B will continue to 
import X from C but it will now sell X to A, eliminating A’s X industry. Compared 
with the CU cases 3b and 3c, there is the same trade creation as A buys its X from C 
instead of producing it at home, but no trade diversion as B continues to buy its X 
from C rather than switching to produce it at home as it does with the CU. This case 
of trade creation is rather an odd one. B imports X from C to satisfy its own 
consumption but produces X which it sells to A. This clearly requires effective rules 
of origin to prevent C’s X from entering A through B.  
In case 4a’, the FTA is clearly superior to the CU. In both cases, A shifts from 
buying its X from the low cost producer C to the higher cost union partner B. 
However, while B shifts from buying its X from C to producing it at home under the 
CU, under the FTA it continues to buy from C. So the pattern of post FTA trade is 
similar to that of 3’ with B buying its X from C but producing X to sell to its partner 
A.  
In contrast to 4a’ in case 4b’ the CU, which produces neither trade creation 
nor trade division, is superior to the FTA, which produces the same pattern of post 
FTA trade as 4a’ with trade diversion occurring as A shifts from buying X from C to 
buying it from its partner B.  
 Comparing 3’ with the three possible cases under a CU, produces ambiguous 
results. Case 3a, where A shifts to buy its X from the lowest cost supplier C, is clearly 
superior to case 3’ where A shifts to buy its X from B. However, cases 3b and 3c are 
clearly inferior to 3’, Under both the FTA and the CU there is trade creation as A 
shifts from making X at home to buying it from B. But under the CU there is an 
offsetting trade diversion as B shifts from importing X from C to producing it at 
home. In the FTA this trade division does not occur.  
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Similarly case 4 produces ambiguous results. With the high post union tariff 
the FTA is superior to the CU, but with the low post union tariff the CU is superior to 
the FTA.  
The reason for these results is interesting. On the one hand, under an FTA, the 
low tariff partner’s external tariff is unchanged. Under a CU this tariff rate is 
increased as long as the common tariff is any weighted average of the partners’ pre-
CU rates. This gives rise to the possibility of an offsetting trade diversion as the lower 
tariff country’s domestic industry gains more protection than it would have had under 
an FTA. On the other hand, the high tariff partner’s external tariff is not reduced 
under an FTA as it would be under a CU. This gives rise to the possibility that under 
an FTA the lower cost union partner may capture the high tariff partner’s market, 
which would have continued to be served by the low cost outside supplier under a 
CU.  
The results in 3’ 4a’ and 4b’ may seem unlikely at first sight.  In this Ricardian 
case,  a formerly non-existent X industry grows up after the RTA is formed to serve 
the partner’s market but not its own. However, when we go to the more usual case of 
differentiated products, some X is likely to be produced in each country with different 
tariff rates determining each county’s ratio of domestic production to imports of the 
range of all the differentiated varieties of the generic product. Alterations in the 
degree of protection in the various markets can then lead to changes in the ratios of 
home production of X to exports and imports of that product.  
So here we have the usual second best result. In spite of all attempts to derive 
a general result that one form of organisation is superior to another, the result depends 
on the context. CUs are superior in some initial specifications of costs, and pre and 
post RTA tariff rates, while FTAs are superior with other specifications. 
Kreuger’s analysis of FTAs   
Let us turn now to Krueger’s analysis (1997a, 1997b, 1999a, 1999b) of FTAs. 
She shows that in particular industries with a rule of origin with high content 
requirements in an FTA, a particular supplier industry in the low tariff partner can 
benefit from protection in the partner country that has the higher tariff on the 
intermediate and the final products.16  She considers the NAFTA cases of the textile 
and automobile industry, both of which sell differentiated products with many 
different variants. She argues that the high Canadian and Mexican tariffs relative to 
those in the U. S combined with the high content requirements for incorporating 
North American yarn and textiles into clothing in order to qualify for FTA tariff 
reductions allowed upstream suppliers and final assemblers in the United States to 
gain market share in the partner countries at the expense of third country imports in a 
clear case of trade diversion.  
This is just Viner’s analysis of the trade diversion effects of a customs union 
transferred to an FTA. In Viner’s analysis, the industry with the lowest costs in the 
customs union will gain market share throughout the trading zone and divert trade 
from lower cost third country suppliers who face the barrier of the common external 
tariff (provided that country’s costs are lower than the foreign cost plus the tariff). In 
                                                
16 The term restrictive rule of origin refers to a rule of origin with a high content requirement for the 
final product in the value chain to qualify for FTA tariff treatment.  
Formatted: Font: Italic
18 
 
an FTA the lower cost industry within the FTA will also tend to gain market share in 
the combined markets at the expense of third country suppliers because if the industry 
fulfils the rules of origin it will benefit from tariff preferences especially in the higher 
tariff partner(s) in the FTA. However, this is a two edged sword. In so far as the 
imports from the lower cost partner displace imports from even lower cost suppliers 
in the rest of the world, this is trade diversion. But in so far is they displace local 
production in the high cost partner, this is trade creation. These two cases are 
respectively the analogues of the  CU (and FTA) case 2 and the FTA case 3’ analysed 
above.   
Although Rules of Origin in an FTA can create scope for trade diversion, they 
also serve to limit that scope since they are normally associated with variations in the 
MFN tariffs of the partners. If the rule of origin for a particular industry has such high 
content requirements that no trade among the FTA/PSA partners qualifies for 
preferential tariff treatment, it is equivalent to excluding the particular industry from 
the agreement. In such a case there will be neither trade diversion nor trade creation in 
terms of direct production effects in that industry and the MFN tariff regime is 
maintained de facto.17  In the more typical scenario where high content requirements 
in the rules of origin limit the volume of intra-FTA trade,  the effects of the restrictive 
rules of origin serve to limit potential trade diversion and also can limit potential trade 
creation.   
Consider the case of textiles and apparel. There are several stages of 
production including making yarn, weaving the fabrics, colouring and finishing the 
fabrics, cutting the clothing, and sewing the clothing products. Different fabrics and 
production processes can be utilised in the production of the clothing. When we break 
down the supply chain by the different stages of production the scope for trade 
creation and trade diversion effects becomes more complex. Removing intra FTA 
tariffs on textiles could lead to trade diversion as higher cost US textiles replace third 
country imports, while a lower price level for fabrics, especially in Canada and 
Mexico, could lead to trade diversion in apparel since the costs of inputs declined 
within the FTA while MFN barriers remained high leading to an increase in effective 
protection for apparel production as compared with third country producers.  Once 
again focusing on production effects, in so far as any replacement occurs of imports 
from the low cost outside world at each stage of the supply chain, this is trade 
diversion; but in so far as it is replacement of the higher cost partner’s production by 
that from the lower cost partner, this is trade creation.  
Kreuger’s comparison of FTA and CUs 
Krueger does not share the typical second best view that there can be no 
unqualified either/or preference for one arrangement over another; instead all real 
world judgments must be context specific.18  Instead she argues: 
                                                
17 A product can be simply excluded from the schedule of intra-FTA tariff reductions. Alternatively 
the level of content required in order to qualify according to the rules of origin, can be made very high 
in a particular industry in order to limit the potential quantity of products which might qualify for intra-
FTA tariff reductions. In the extreme case this could be equivalent to excluding the product from the 
FTA.   
18 This second best message in considered in the modern context in Lipsey (2007).  
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“an FTA cannot lead to any more trade creation than can a customs 
union and, when ROOs export any protection, an FTA leads to more trade 
diversion than does a customs union.  The proof is straightforward. All 
that needs to be assumed [!] is that [1] the customs union adopts a 
common tariff for each commodity at a level somewhere between that 
prevailing pre-union in the higher-tariff country and the lower-tariff 
country, [2] that the common external tariff be such that effective rates of 
protection are not increased under customs union, [3] there is no 'water' in 
either country's tariff schedule, and  [4] that cost curves are either constant 
or upward sloping.”  Krueger (1997b: 180) (emphasis added) 
To examine Krueger’s claim we need to look carefully at her four 
assumptions. Assumption [1] seems a reasonable one given all the historical evidence 
from the many existing RTAs and we consider the others in the following three 
subsections.  
Effective protection 
Krueger’s assumption 2 is a strong assumption that the hypothesised customs 
union to which an FTA is being compared does not increase effective protection for 
industries at different stages of the supply chain. In the Viner case, the CU must 
increase the effective protection of the lower-tariff union partner, while the FTA does 
not.  In the more complex case of supply chains and differentiated products,  the 
creation of a CU can lead to subtle changes in rates of effective protection for 
different stages of production in the supply chain as compared with competition with 
third country producers. With between 10,000 to 20,000 tariff lines, which is typical 
of most countries, the process of “averaging” the external tariffs of partners forming a 
customs union can easily increase effective protection at various stages in production 
in any, or indeed all, of the partners as compared with third countries, depending on 
the details of the common tariff schedule created by the CU. For example, lowering 
input tariffs for an industrial activity will raise effective protection relative to third 
country producers even if the tariff on the output remains constant. Krueger 
acknowledges these possibilities but argues that non-members of the CU in the WTO 
would not accept any increases in effective protection when a customs union is 
formed. 
 One wonders how easy it would be to discover any increase in effective 
protection in such cases and, if discovered, what could be done about it. Krueger 
assumes that non-members of a CU are very clever in understanding possible shifts in 
effective protection affecting their exporting industries and are able to press their 
claims in the WTO effectively while simultaneously assuming the opposite for non-
members of an FTA. The latter are assumed often not to understand possible shifts in 
effective protection affecting their exporting industries and, when they do understand, 
to be unable to press their potential claims in the WTO. This asymmetry seems 
implausible. 
In any case, the GATT/WTO has never had very effective disciplines on the 
formation of RTAs under Article XXIV whether customs unions or FTAs. Non-
members of a customs union can request renegotiation of tariff and market access 
schedules in the GATT/WTO if they believe their export interests are affected 
adversely by the formation of a customs union but  these negotiations can drag on for 
20 
 
years or even decades. In the case of CUs, FTAs or PSAs formed under  the Enabling 
Clause there are essentially no obligations on developing-country WTO members. 
 It seems clear that either a CU or an FTA can alter effective protection at 
different stages of the supply chain, giving rise to both trade creation and trade 
diversion. In a CU the details of creation of the common external tariff can have 
effects on the pattern of effective protection against third county producers and can 
influence the potential for trade creation and trade diversion. In an FTA the original 
MFN tariffs are retained but the removal of the intra-FTA tariffs and the incentive 
effects of rules of origin can affect the pattern of effective protection against third 
country producers causing trade creation and trade diversion.   
Water in the tariff 
Krueger’s third assumption is that there is no water under the tariff. This 
situation can arise for two quite distinct reasons. First, marginal costs may be 
increasing for reasons such as are analysed in the Hecksher-Ohlin model. In this case, 
domestic marginal cost will be closely related to the tariff burdened foreign price, at 
least under perfect competition. We discuss this case below. Second, domestic 
oligopolistic producers may price their product up to the foreign price plus the tariff, 
while their costs are much lower. They then absorb the difference in extra profits. 
There is substantial evidence that restrictions to competition often lead to the second 
result.   
If we consider this second reason for water under the tariff, we have the above 
cases 3’ vs. 3a-3c and 4a vs. 4a’ as possible results of a FTA-CU comparison. From 
this it is clear that there are circumstances in which CUs can cause more trade 
diversion than FTAs. Once again, this is a second best result that depends on the 
context-specific environment in which the comparisons are made.      
Cost curves are either constant or upward sloping 
We have already considered the constant cost (Ricardian) case above and 
found that in some situations an FTA can lead to less trade diversion than a CUs and 
in other situations to more. In the case of upward sloping supply curves, and with the 
added assumption of no water in the tariff, there will be a positive correlation between 
a country’s costs of production and its pre-RTA tariffs. With homogenous 
commodities and perfect competition, the domestic price will tend towards the world 
price inclusive of the tariff. With product differentiation and imperfect competition, 
the relationship between the costs and the tariff rates will be less direct, but as noted 
above, firms will tend to price up to the tariff.  Of course, the net economic effects 
will still depend up the precise structure of the CU tariffs compared to the pre-RTA 
structure as well as the production cost structure. 
Regional Integration and Intra-industry Trade 
Much of the early policy analysis of FTAs was been based on the Ricardian 
case , while ignoring consumption and terms of trade effects.  The introduction of 
economies of scale and product differentiation to which we now turn has important 
further implications for the analysis of the welfare effects of both RTAs and 
multilateral liberalization.19 
                                                
19 See Brander and Krugman (1983) and Lancaster (1980). 
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Early work by Eastman and Stykolt (1960) indicated the potential for intra-
industry adjustments to trade liberalization in oligopolistic industries where 
economies of scale create gains from tariff reductions greatly in excess of those that 
would occur in the Ricardian case. The theory of intra-industry trade was more fully 
developed by Grubel and Lloyd (1975). These authors observed that the EEC 
integration in the 1960s, led to increased two-way trade in differentiated products 
with increased intra-industry specialization within specific variants of differentiated 
products and simultaneously to less inter-industry shifts in output than most observers 
had foreseen. For example, the result of the EU’s formation was not the domination of 
one country’s car industry but a great increase in purchases of various foreign-made 
cars in each of the EU countries, many of whom continued to make and purchase 
domestically made cars as well. Subsequently, similar observations of other 
developed countries forming RTAs led to a wider consideration of monopolistic 
competition and oligopolistic industries characterised by product differentiation.20  
It is now understood that because developed countries typically contain many 
monopolistically competitive and oligopolistic industries producing differentiated 
products, the new trade that results from an RTA  is relatively less in homogeneous 
products with the consequent large inter-industry shifts and relatively more in 
different variants of each differentiated product. Thus a new RTA results in complex 
intra-industry adjustments. These result in scale effects, product specialisation effects, 
pro-competitive pricing effects, and induced direct investment and innovation effects 
occurring separately from actual direct trade effects. The increase in contestability 
also becomes important.  
The incorporation of product differentiation and economies of scale into 
international trade theory provides an explanation not only for the vast expansion of 
intra-industry trade but also for the expansion of intra-industry foreign investment 
flows among the developed countries in recent decades. Greatly increased 
competition has been created by the mutual interpenetration of markets by 
multinational enterprises. In this environment, the multinational enterprise provides, 
among other things, an effective mechanism for the international transmission of 
technology.   
Early empirical estimates of the economic gains from new RTA-induced trade 
were in the order of one percent of GNP, although these potential gains can be 
underestimated due to aggregation bias. (For examples see Johnson (1964), Verdoorn 
(1960) and Wemelsfelder (1960).21 These studies were based, either impocitly or 
expllcitly, on the assumptions that industries were characterized by constant returns to 
scale and competitive structures. In contrast, the pioneering work by the Wonnacotts 
(1967) indicated that given the then-existing economies of scale in manufacturing 
industries, the gains to Canada from free trade with the United States would be much 
larger, ranging up to ten percent of GNP. Similarly, the Harris-Cox (1983) analysis of 
                                                
20 The introduction of imperfect competition and scale economies has been linked to new models of 
international trade under imperfect competition, drawing abundantly from industrial organisation 
economics (Helpman and Krugman 1985, Smith and Venables 1988).  A different but complementary 
line of analysis emphasises differences in technology and endogenous technologies. See Romer (1986), 
Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar (2005). 
21 As shown by Feenstra (1995) the use of average tariffs for industry or products groups can lead to 
serious underestimation of the costs of tariffs to the economy.  
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Canada-U.S. free trade in the 1980s and the analysis of completing the internal market 
in the European Community obtained substantial gains from further trade 
liberalization because of the existence of economies of scale and product 
differentiation, as well as pro-competitive responses by oligopolistic industries. (See 
also Cecchini (1988).) Trefler (2004) produced even more dramatic results in a 
retrospective assessment of the Canada U.S. FTA.  
In these studies, the gains from trade liberalization result both from reducing 
domestic trade barriers and from obtaining better access to foreign markets. The latter 
induces rationalization of the domestic industrial structure to exploit scale economies, 
which enhance productivity. The literature of industrial organisation points to several 
sources of these internal economies. They arise not only from being able to produce 
at, or closer to, the minimum efficient scales (MESs) for the product variants being 
exported but also in spreading over a larger output the fixed costs both of design of 
new variants (that are necessary for continued success in the fierce world of 
international competition) and of marketing the products.   
In addition to these economies of scale that are internal to firms, there are 
potential dynamic gains from trade that result from economies of scale external to 
firms.22 Since external gains are difficult, if not impossible to measure, they are 
frequently ignored or neglected in policy analysis. The sources of these external 
economies derive from such factors as the development of skilled human capital with 
specialized expertise and the diffusion of technology among firms in an industry and 
across industries. Open and outward-looking trade and payments regimes enhance 
efficiency in the allocation of scarce investment capital, reduce the incentives for 
investment of entrepreneurial talent and capital in rent-seeking and lobbying 
activities. Also, by stimulating investment and competition, they may encourage 
innovation, adaptation, and diffusion of technology throughout the economy.   
Strategic Trade Policies 
The analysis of trade theory with economies of scale and product 
differentiation led to a literature exploring the scope for strategic trade policy (STP) 
interventions.23 Various strands of this STP literature derive optimum tariff or subsidy 
policies by home governments which enable them to collude with domestic firms in 
order to improve economic welfare of the home country at the expense of foreign 
companies and governments. However the links between STP and regional integration 
have not been explored to the same extent.24 
There are several caveats that apply to this strategic trade policy literature. 
First, as Eaton and Grossman (1986) have observed, the subsidy or tariff policies that 
are optimal under one set of hypothesized assumptions are not robust with respect to 
                                                
22 For a more detailed study of these externalities that can be massive see Carlaw and Lipsey (2002). 
23 This literature has been extensively surveyed. See, for example, Richard G. Harris (1989), J.A. 
Brander (1987); and A.K. Dixit (1986). 
24 In the literature, these policies are often referred to as strategic trade and industrial policies. 
However, these have no relation to the kinds of industrial policy for developing new industries and new 
technologies that are emphasised by the literature on evolutionary economics and that have had notable 
successes in such countries as Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea and Brazil, as well, of course, as 
notable failures. For detailed analyses see Lipsey and Wills (1996), Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar (2005: 
Chapters 16 and 17), Wade (1990) and Westphal (1990).    
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alternative plausible assumptions about the behavioural responses of firms in 
imperfectly competitive markets. Second, firms have an incentive to over invest in 
lobbying activity designed to manipulate strategic trade policies.25 Thus, in practice 
governments might implement policies that deviate substantially from the 
hypothetical optimal tariff and subsidy measures. Third, the models ignore potential 
retaliation by foreign governments or even the possibility that foreign governments 
will engage in similar practices.  
In most of the models analysing strategic trade policies, the home country and 
the home firm collude to obtain economic benefits at the expense of the trading 
partner, which presumes that the foreign exporter does not notice, is unwilling to, or is 
unable to, mount a response. The impact on the foreign country of these types of trade 
interventions to shift the terms of trade in particular products is unambiguously 
negative, but this is not considered in the analysis. However, one plausible conjecture 
is that countries have negotiated the GATT/WTO rules, and RTAs that limit the use 
of tariffs or prohibit export subsidies in the industrial sector, in order to avoid such 
terms of trade losses. The “mercantilist bargaining” in the traditional GATT 
negotiations, or in the negotiation of RTAs, can be viewed as mutual disarmament of 
both “protectionist” and “strategic” trade interventions. Thus STP provides a rationale 
for the attractiveness of RTAs both in terms of potential economic gains and in 
forestalling strategic trade policies. It is also worth noting that in the absence of 
RTAs, there could be greater recourse to protectionist or strategic trade policies that 
would restrict trade significantly and could ignite retaliatory trade wars. 
Services and Investment  
So far the analysis of economic effects has focused on trade in goods. Now we 
turn briefly to the question of the implications for RTAs of trade in services and 
investment.   
Historically the creation of the EEC, and the subsequent deepening of the 
internal market in the EU, and the Canada-US FTA and the NAFTA that followed it 
led the way in liberalising cross-border trade in services. They also had a major effect 
on investment flows by subjecting foreign investment to the “national treatment 
clause” whereby any restriction on investment in a particular industry or sector had to 
be applied equally to domestic as well as foreign owned investment. At the time, these 
were path breaking achievements, and they provided guidance to the Uruguay Round 
negotiations that led to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) under 
the WTO.  
One important limitation to analysis of these areas is that the analytical tools 
for quantitative measurement of barriers to trade in services and to investment are less 
developed than for trade in goods. This hampers the analysis of potential welfare 
gains and losses from removal of barriers to trade in services and to investment 
whether on a multilateral or regional basis. Thus it is more difficult to measure the 
potential welfare effects of the RTAs that have liberalised trade in goods and services 
compared with those that have been restricted mainly to trade in goods. 
Since the creation of the WTO, many more RTAs have been notified under 
Article XXIV of the GATT (1994) than have been notified under Article V of the 
                                                
25 See, for example, Bhagwati and Srinivason (1983). 
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GATS. Most of the latter correspond to, or build in a modest way on, the multilateral 
commitments of the RTA partners under the WTO and have been closely related to 
the obligations that the partner countries have under the GATS. Thus, at least to date 
there is not much scope for discrimination in trade in services or investment under 
RTAs that would give rise to issues analogous to trade creation and trade diversion for 
trade in goods. As a result, the analysis of customs unions and FTAs in terms of 
potential trade creation and trade diversion for goods is appropriate for analysis of 
most RTAs. This situation could change in the future if the multilateral negotiations in 
Doha remain blocked while new RTAs and amendments to existing ones begin to 
make more progress on liberalising investment flows and trade in services. 
III. POLITICAL ECONOMY EFFECTS 
In the introduction, we noted that many economists, in particular Krueger and 
Bhagwati, argue that the political economy effects of RTAs, whether CUs or FTAs, 
tend to inhibit further global trade liberation through the WTO. In contrast, we 
suggest that there are considerations on both sides of the political economy issue. Any 
successful regional or multilateral negotiation changes the coalition dynamics for 
subsequent trade negotiations with effects that can be positive, neutral, or negative. 
Also, the effects in a particular case can be mixed with different responses in different 
industries. In this section, we elaborate on these issues.  
We do not argue that the political economy effects are unequivocally 
beneficial, but rather that there are sufficient points on both sides that one should keep 
an open mind until further evidence is gathered ─ currently these effects have not had 
much systematic study, either theoretically or empirically. We list those effects that 
we can identify as having an unfavourable, neutral, or favourable influences. The 
favourable cases then subdivide into the four separate issues mentioned in the 
introduction and covered in the sub-headings in  the following section.   
While this section mainly applies to all RTAs, at the outset it is worth noting 
an important difference between FTAs and CUs in the process of subsequent trade 
negotiations with third countries. In an FTA each partner retains the right to negotiate 
separately with third countries. In a CU the subsequent negotiating position must be a 
joint position. This has two consequences.  First it is easier for individual FTA 
members to negotiate subsequent reductions in trade barriers then for CUs to 
negotiate with third countries either multilaterally or regionally. Second to the extent 
that the effect of high third country tariffs is to provide greater protection to exporters 
from the FTA partners as Krueger suggests, then FTA partners are more likely to 
offer reductions in these high tariff barriers in subsequent reciprocal negotiations with 
third countries, especially if domestic production shrinks after the FTA is 
implemented. 
Unfavourable Influences 
 Both multilateral and regional negotiations may reduce the interest of 
individuals, firms and government bodies in subsequent multilateral trade 
liberalization efforts. The reason is that the political economy of trade negotiations 
relies to a great extent on mercantilist bargaining to mobilise export oriented producer 
groups to counteract protectionist import competing interests.26 Thus, any successful 
                                                
26 Issues of this sort are explored theoretically in Grossman and Helpman (1995a, 1995b).  
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trade negotiation, whether regional or multilateral, can cause erosion of the political 
support for future negotiations because it has already achieved some industry’s goals 
of assuring better access to its main export markets. 
RTAs inhibiting MTAs 
 A possible example with respect to RTAs concerns the secure access to the 
large American market that is the most important destination for the exports of many 
Canadian and Mexican firms. The NAFTA might, therefore, have reduced the number 
of industries interested in participating actively in domestic coalitions supporting 
further trade liberalization, either regionally or multilaterally. This is the concern 
expressed by Krueger (1997a, 1997b, 1999a, 1999b) about the implications of 
NAFTA and other FTAs on the political economy of trade negotiations. Similarly for 
countries such as Turkey, access to the large contiguous EU market is very important 
and entry into that RTA might have similar effects. Unfortunately, there has been 
little research on this issue so that although it is distinct possibility, there is no 
compelling evidence that it is an actuality.  
MTAs inhibiting further MTAs 
 In contrast, there are clear examples of MTAs having weakening effects on 
industrial participation in further MTA negotiations. One is the effects of the 
International Technology Agreement in the WTO in 1996. In this sector, the spread of 
the global supply chain for production of computer and telecommunications products 
is such that a significant number of WTO members were able to reach a consensus on 
eliminating tariffs on products at various stages of the supply chain for computer and 
telecommunications products. Although this was a remarkable success in the WTO, 
some commentators have suggested that it has contributed to subsequent difficulties 
in the Doha negotiations because it removed a major industry group from support of 
further trade liberalization in a significant number of countries  
A different but related problem is that as a result of successive rounds of 
negotiations in the GATT/WTO, where the developed countries made greater tariff 
reductions than other members, the large emerging markets such as Brazil, China, 
India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Russia, and South Africa have higher tariffs on average 
and more tariff lines above 15 percent rates than do the EC, Canada, Japan and US.27 
Thus it is more difficult to engage in mercantilist bargaining due to the asymmetry in 
tariff structures.  
 For a final example, the success of the Doha negotiations in the granting by 
developed countries of unilateral Duty Free, Quota Free Trade to the least developed 
countries implies that the latter countries now have little to gain from further 
successful negotiations in the Doha negotiations while they stand to lose from erosion 
of their preferences. 
In conclusion, it is worth noting that possibly the causation is the reverse of 
that assumed by those who think RTAs inhibit WTO negations. The slow and 
inconclusive nature of WTO negotiators may encourage those who wish to liberalise 
trading relations to resort to RTAs. We will return to this issue below.   
                                                
27 Note the Russian Federation is not a WTO member, although it is negotiating accession.  
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Neutral Influences 
Some of the most important problems facing multilateral negotiations are 
apparently uninfluenced by the existence or non-existence of FTAs. In these cases, the 
negotiation of further FTAs will have little or no effect, either way, on the success of 
further multilateral negotiations.  
The governments of countries that are also members of the major FTAs and 
CUs, such as the U.S., Canada and Mexico, show no signs of being less committed to 
the Doha round than others. It is possible that some particular industries are less 
interested, but their governments show no lack of interest in the MTS. The same can 
be said for Europeans. Indeed, the European Community was quite proactive in 
supporting the Doha negotiations despite reservations of some member states 
concerning liberalization of agriculture. A large group of developing countries has 
sought to retain preferences but these are unrelated to the existence of RTAs.  
Of the many major reasons for resisting the changes being advocated in the 
Doha round, the following had little or nothing to do with membership in RTAs. India 
is concerned about protecting agriculture. Countries such as Brazil and India are 
reluctant to cut their high tariffs. China has lowered tariffs but takes the position that 
it made enough reductions in its trade barriers in the WTO accession negotiations to 
relieve it from further obligations to make reductions in trade barriers comparable to 
other countries in the Doha negotiations.  Many developing countries, especially in 
Africa, do not want the Doha negotiations to succeed because they have tariff 
preferences in the markets of industrial countries, especially against China, which has 
been graduated from GSP in most products. Canada is protecting its agricultural 
marketing boards while the U.S. is protecting agricultural subsidies, both of which are 
exempt from the NAFTA. While the EU is protecting agriculture in multilateral 
negotiations, its common agricultural policy (the CAP) is permitted by EU rules. 
Another problem is that the EU and the U.S. have low tariffs and so have less to offer 
in mercantilist bargaining with the middle income countries. But these low tariffs are 
the result of bargaining under successive GATT rounds and have nothing to do with 
FTAs. Indeed the main countries who seem to be focused on retaining their own tariff 
preferences are the poorest African countries. Although technically they are not in 
FTAs, (except a few now in interim Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with 
the EU) or in PSAs, they do get preferences under the enabling clause in the WTO, or 
the preferences of Duty-Free, Quota-Free access for the least developed countries. 
The latter was one “political” success of the Doha negotiations and of course 
unrelated to the existence or non-existence of RTAs.   
It is important to bear in mind that since the conclusion of the Tokyo Round in 
1979 there has been only one successful conclusion of a broad multilateral negotiation 
and that was the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1993. The expansion of the 
number of countries engaged in trade negotiations and the asymmetries in trade 
policies and negotiating interests have made it increasingly difficult to conclude a 
major multilateral negotiation. 
Favourable Influences 
There are many reasons why the political economy dynamic of RTAs may be 
favourable to further trade liberalisation.   
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More Common Interest Among FTA than WTO Members   
 Both the customs union of the EU and the free trade area of NAFTA showed 
that when a small number of countries with major common interests negotiate, it is 
possible to reach agreement on a wide range of liberalising measures, including 
reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers, relaxation of restrictions on and protection 
of foreign investment, liberalisation of trade in services, the creation of an effective 
dispute settlement mechanisms, and solution of a host of specific problems, all in a 
relatively short period of time (measured against the slow pace of the Doha round 
negotiations). There is compelling evidence that this was the case prior to the 
formation of the WTO. Both the EEC and the EFTA pioneered approaches to dealing 
with non-tariff barriers, while the steady deepening of integration of the EEC through 
the internal market initiative led the way to the removal of barriers to trade in services 
and international investment flows. Similarly the Canada-US FTA and the NAFTA 
developed approaches to dealing with services and investment that contributed to the 
Uruguay Round negotiations and the development of multilateral rules for trade in 
services under the General Agreement on Trade in Services under the WTO.  
 Most of the recent FTAs have been confined mainly to trade in manufactured 
goods, with some additional measures affecting investment and services that tend 
either to incorporate or make very modest additions to the commitments under the 
WTO. However, both the EU and the NAFTA show that when a small number of 
countries with relatively common interests are determined to do so they can create 
arrangements that go deeper than existing multilateral arrangements. When these are 
shown to work, they can act as templates for subsequent multilateral agreements.  
Favourable Internal Pressures for Deepening Existing RTAs  
 Internal pressures within an FTA often work towards more trade liberalization 
among the members than was established initially when the agreement was 
negotiated. This is because the rationalisation of production and trade that follows 
from the creation of an FTA leads to a lowering of the cost structure of industries, 
both through their expansion and through the “restructuring” of imperfectly 
competitive industries. As they become more confident of their ability to compete due 
to falling cost and expanding intra-industry trade, there can be a dynamic favouring 
deeper integration within the RTA.  
The evolution of the EEC into the European Community and now the 
European Union provides an excellent example of this dynamic. The EU has 
deepened through development of common standards, liberalisation of trade in 
services, investment and labour mobility. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
provides another example, as it gradually evolves from a limited PSA into a more 
comprehensive FTA with Framework Agreements on services and investment.  Over 
time, multilateral liberalisation through unilateral tariff reductions and gradual 
development of AFTA has led to the expansion of regional production  networks 
which has reinforced the integration process.  
Favourable Internal Pressures for External Liberalisation 
 Internal pressures within an FTA often work towards further reductions of 
barriers against trade with the outside world. The rationalisation of production and 
trade that follows from the creation of an FTA leads to changes in the cost structure of 
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industries both through their  expansion  or contraction and through the 
“restructuring” of imperfectly competitive industries.   
To illustrate, consider a country, A, suffering trade diversion as a result of 
entering an FTA. It was importing product X from the rest of the world in spite of its 
tariffs, while its new partner, B, was producing X at home under its tariff protection. 
When the union is formed, B’s X can undersell the tariff burdened X coming from 
abroad.  
First, consider the Ricardian case. Because there was no industry producing X 
in A, there are no local protectionist pressures coming from an X industry located 
there. After the union, A’s tariff revenue on X is eliminated and the external tariff 
serves only to distort trade flows. These changes set up several political economy 
pressures for A to reduce its external tariff on X. (1) Since there is no domestic 
industry to protest tariff reductions on X, reduction of A’s tariff on that product is a 
good bargaining chip in multilateral liberalising negotiations. (2) If after the RTA is 
formed A reduces its tariff on X sufficiently, it will restore trade in X with the outside 
world and gain in living standards as the lower real cost producers in the outside 
world replace the higher cost producers located in its union partner. (3) The shift to 
sources outside of the RTA will restore some of the tariff revenue that disappeared 
when its partner displaced the outside world as supplier of X to A (not completely 
because the tariff must be below its pre-FTA level to make the imported product 
competitive against B’s tariff free export to A).  
Second, consider a homogeneous product produced by price taking firms with 
constant returns to scale but with an upward sloping industry supply curve due to 
either Hecksher-Ohlin factor market effects or sector specific factors with diminishing 
returns. For example, farmland can be shifted between livestock grazing and crops 
depending on relative prices but some farm land will be infra-marginal and other farm 
land will be marginal in one of the crops. In this case, there could be some high cost 
production in A behind its high MFN tariff. As the tariff is reduced to zero for the 
FTA partner, imports from the low cost third country supplier will shrink and imports 
will rise from the FTA partner. In this case, there will be trade diversion when imports 
fall from the low cost third country producer to be replaced by imports from the 
partner B and trade creation from replacing high cost domestic production in A with 
lower cost imports from B. Tariff revenue on the imports from third countries will 
also be reduced. In terms of the political economy effects, the “benefits” of the MFN 
tariff in terms of market share and terms of trade effects will accrue primarily to B’s 
exporters after the FTA is implemented. The political economy effects for the A will 
be similar to those of the classical case discussed above. 
Third, consider the more common case of product differentiation and scale 
economies in the production of each variant of that product. Now what was an either-
or case under  Ricardian assumptions becomes a matter of degree. All three areas A, 
B, and (the many different parts of) the outside world are likely to have industries 
producing at least some of the variants of product X. But because country A is less 
efficient in X than country B, it will likely have a smaller industry than the more 
efficient industry in B. When the FTA is formed, A’s industry will need to restructure 
to meet increased price competition from its FTA partner. What happens next depends 
on how the industry in A responds. Consider two polar cases. 
At one extreme, A’s industry X was producing at very high cost and is unable 
to cut its price or restructure sufficiently to respond successfully to increased 
29 
 
competition in the FTA. It will lose market share to imports from B. In the extreme 
case, the A’s domestic industry may exit the production of the all variants of X.  Here 
the political economy effects are similar as those outlined above in the classical case.  
At the other extreme, A’s X industry is able to respond successfully to both the 
increased price competition from B and the opening of B’s market. The response will 
likely take two forms. First pricing will come closer to costs (where before the FTA, 
A’s industries priced their products just below what the tariff burdened price of 
imports would have been). Second, there will be restructuring to produce those 
variants in which its costs relative to B are lowest thus taking advantage of scale 
economies of longer production runs. Intra-industry trade in X will expand among the 
FTA partners and the unit costs in both A and B’s X industry will decline as the 
industries in both countries gain economies of longer production runs of a smaller set 
of variants of product X. Typically, third country imports of X will shrink. Also, the 
increased competition between B and A will create incentives for innovation.  
The political economy of this case is interesting. The X industry’s original 
belief that its continued existence depended on high tariff will be eroded as it finds 
that it can stand up to competition from B. Also, it will receive diminishing direct 
benefits from the high tariff on X from third countries because, as the industry 
becomes more competitive within the FTA, it must also become more competitive 
with third countries. Although the domestic industry may continue to obtain 
somewhat higher prices and better profit margins in the domestic market due to the 
higher MFN tariff, increased competition within the FTA will tend to limit this effect. 
As A’s X industry restructures within the FTA and expands exports to its FTA 
partner, it will become more difficult to make the political case for retaining the high 
MFN tariff because production and employment will be less directly linked to limiting 
competition from third country sources. In some cases where the restructuring of A’s 
X industry is particularly successful, the industry will see new opportunities to expand 
exports through reciprocal negotiations with third countries, either in subsequent 
FTAs or through multilateral negotiations. An example is the Canadian wine industry 
that feared elimination in the original Canada-U.S. FTA. Instead, with some 
transitional government assistance, it restructured to improve quality and became so 
successful that it now not only completes well with wine from California and other 
U.S. sources, but exports many wines, some of which have won prizes in Europe.   
It is true that in some protected sectors in existing FTAs, the rules of origin are 
restrictive and the MFN trade barriers have remained relatively high. Yet typically 
over time as the FTA is implemented, some restructuring of these protected sectors 
occurs within the FTA and further trade liberalisation becomes politically possible. 
Both the Canada-U.S. and the ASEAN FTAs provide examples.   
The textile and apparel industry in both Canada and the United States had 
resisted liberalisation in the GATT. The industry had succeeded in lobbying the 
governments to retain both high MFN tariffs and to support other developed countries 
in the restrictive Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), which from the 1960s to the 1990s 
provided for managed trade in textiles and apparel through export quotas. Now, 
highly restrictive rules of origin created major barriers to countries outside the 
Canada-US FTA and its successor,  the NAFTA. Although, as this discussion reveals, 
the textile sector in North America in the 1990s could hardly be described as a bastion 
of global free trade, the relevant questions in terms of Krueger’s conjecture are: “Did 
they become more protectionist after NAFTA?” and “Did they become more 
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influential in obtaining protection?” The answer seems to be “No” to both questions. 
Indeed, there has been significant multilateral liberalisation in this protected sector 
subsequent to the NAFTA. During the Uruguay Round, the textile and apparel 
industry in both countries agreed, albeit reluctantly, to a ten-year phase out of the 
special rules and quantitative restrictions for textile trade under the WTO.28 Again 
reluctantly, the industry agreed to the accession of China to the WTO, albeit with 
special safeguards, which were subsequently invoked. Also, as noted above the textile 
and apparel sectors experienced increased competition in the domestic marketplace 
from the introduction of Duty Free and Quota Free access for less developed countries 
as a decision taken at the time of the launch of the Doha negotiations. Furthermore, in 
some cases the rules of origin in textiles in NAFTA have subsequently been 
liberalised to allow more third country imports to be utilised in products qualifying 
for intra-NAFTA trade after the industry had restructured. Thus the restrictive rules of 
origin in textiles in NAFTA cited by Krueger (1997a ,1997b) as an example of 
unfavourable political economy effects have in fact been liberalised as the 
implementation of the NAFTA has proceeded. More importantly, there has been 
significant multilateral liberalization of textiles and apparel trade since the NAFTA.   
Another example of gradual liberalisation in protected sectors after the 
formation of an RTA is the ASEAN FTA (AFTA) in South East Asia. Initially, the 
AFTA was a partial scope agreement with many product exceptions for the most 
protected sectors. Yet over time through seven rounds of AFTA negotiations, these 
product exceptions have gradually been brought into the AFTA coverage. At the 14th 
ASEAN summit in 2009, there was a commitment to eliminate the remaining 
exceptions by 2015. In a number of cases, the AFTA partners have negotiated 
additional FTAs with third countries including China, Korea, Japan, Australia and 
New Zealand, which have led to a widening of the number of countries whose 
producers are eligible for the lower duties and which aim for elimination of most 
duties. Thus there has been a step by step dynamic in ASEAN to widen the coverage 
of the AFTA and considerable willingness to negotiate FTAs with third countries.  
The political economy effects that can be positive for trade liberalization 
involve primarily the restructuring of import-competing industries. Of course export 
oriented industries may also restructure as a result of the FTA and may become more 
export oriented, particularly with industries producing differentiated products, but we 
do not consider this case further.  
Pressures for multilateralism at the systemic level.  
In contrast to concerns that  RTAs contribute to the erosion of the multilateral 
trading system, there are also reasons why membership in RTAs can lead to greater 
willingness to participate in multilateral negotiations. One reason is that smaller 
countries who negotiate FTAs with large developed countries will lock in a more 
comprehensive liberalisation of their trade regime. (See Ethier (1998).)  Since small 
countries often retain considerable latitude for trade restrictions in the WTO through 
tariff bindings that are above the applied rate and other measures, the “lock-in” effect 
of FTA disciplines commits them more firmly to an open trade regime through 
                                                
28 The negotiation of new rules for intellectual property rights in the Uruguay Round was important to 
some segments of the textiles and apparel industry.  
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subsequent negotiations and reduces the likelihood of volatile domestic politics 
reversing the liberalization.  
The willingness of some key countries to negotiate further RTAs may provide 
a spur for others to enter multilateral negotiations as an alternative to being left out of 
further RTAs. For example, although developing countries had always resisted taking 
on obligations and making tariff concessions in the GATT, they were for the first time 
full participants in GATT negotiations of the Uruguay Round. It proved difficult to 
conclude these complex multi-issue negotiations with a very large group of 
participating countries. However, as mentioned in an earlier section, the willingness 
of the United States to negotiate free trade agreements with some countries provided a 
prod to other countries to negotiate multilaterally. In an earlier example, the belief 
that negotiation of FTAs was a credible strategy to induce other countries to engage in 
multilateral negotiations was widely held in the debate during the negotiations of the 
Canada-US FTA and the NAFTA. See Smith (1993).  
Another reason arises when an RTA concentrates a member’s trade with its 
partners. There may then be political pressures to diversify, under multilateral 
negotiations. For example, over 80 percent of Canada’s foreign trade was with the U. 
S. after the completion of the NAFTA. This concentration on one export market 
worried policy makers who took whatever opportunities presented themselves to push 
for more trade agreements, ─ MTAs or RTAs ─  that would lessen that dependence. 
Currently, Canada is negotiating for an FTA with the EU, which would accomplish 
significant trade liberalisation while reducing Canada’s dependence on the U.S. 
market.   
Finally, the proliferation of overlapping RTAs inevitably leaves some 
countries out. The process of competitive liberalisation in RTAs puts pressure on 
countries not participating actively in RTAs to engage more actively in multilateral 
negotiations. Furthermore, the multiple ROOs in overlapping FTAs do impose 
administrative and compliance costs on firms thus reducing the trade gains. Thus 
enterprises operating within RTAs may support further multilateral liberalisation in 
order to minimise the costs of compliance with ROOs and to widen further their 
production networks.  
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
While we agree that MFN is a key principle in the MTS, it is important to take 
note of some important facts. First, from the second half of the 19th century, problems 
arose with the MFN treaties. Tariffs and other trade restrictions were on a rising trend, 
reaching successively higher peaks in the 1890s, after WWI, and in the early 1930s. 
The MFN treaties of the 19th century  collapsed in a longer term trend of rising 
protectionism which reached its apex in the interwar period.   
Second, the Golden age of MFN tariff negotiations was the first two decades 
after WWII when a small group of developed countries were involved in the 
negotiations. It was also a time when tariffs were high as a legacy of the peaks of 
protectionism reached in the interwar period.  
Third, compared to the early post war period, multilateral trade negotiations 
have become much more difficult to conclude due to several factors. The last 
successful major multilateral negotiation was the completion of the Uruguay Round in 
1993 and there have only been two major rounds in the last four decades. More 
32 
 
countries have become involved in the negotiations and there are significant 
asymmetries in trade regimes. The legacy of six decades of liberalisation by 
developed countries in the GATT/WTO means that their bound tariff schedules in the 
WTO are much lower than many developing countries. As a result there is less scope 
for “mercantilist” bargaining in the WTO today. Also the agenda for the multilateral 
negotiations has become much broader dealing with tariffs, non-tariff measures, 
trading rules, trade in services and intellectual property. In addition, unilateral 
preferences for many developing countries have been a further important departure 
from the principle of MFN in addition to provisions for FTAs and CUs under the 
GATT/WTO and their interests in limiting erosion of tariff preferences reduces 
support for multilateral negotiations. In this context it is not surprising that the Doha 
negotiations have proved difficult.   
At the outset, we posed the question of whether MTAs and RTAs were 
complements or substitutes. We have offered many reasons why they can complement 
each other as well as evidence that they have actually done so in several important 
cases. When this happens, they interact in a mutually reenforcing, positive feedback 
dynamic. However RTAs may also act in some ways as substitutes for MTAs, but for 
two very different reasons. First, the pessimists may be right in that membership in 
RTAs diminishes the interest of individuals and firms in supporting further 
multilateral negotiations, in which case they are substitutes in a harmful sense. But if 
further multilateral negotiations become increasingly difficult to conclude 
satisfactorily, they may be substitutes in the beneficial sense that they are a seoncd 
best alternative for trade liberalisation when the first best of multilateral negotiations 
proves unworkable.      
In support of the complimentary hypothesis, we believe that the relatively 
optimistic view we took twenty years ago about the potential evolution of trade 
liberalisation has proved valid (Lipsey and Smith 1989). There have been no major 
rounds of multilateral tariff reductions negotiated since the creation of the WTO but 
the NAFTA partners and the  European Community and its member states, all actively 
supported the completion of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO in spite 
of being already involved in fairly deep integrations through their respective RTAs. 
The reason was that both sets of countries had broader market access issues and 
policy choices that could only be addressed in a multilateral context.  The successful 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the resulting creation of the WTO has had great 
significance for the multilateral trading system. 
The large number of cross-region RTAs that have been negotiated in recent 
years suggests that the WTO member countries continue to be willing to engage in 
more open commerce and that the restructuring of production and trade that occurs as 
a result of RTAs may on balance have a positive influence on further trade 
liberalisation. Although this might well lead to a greater willingness to engage in 
multilateral trade liberalisation by some industries, other industries may lose interest 
in further negotiations. It is thus impossible to predict conclusively the net effects of 
this rapidly evolving process. However, given the number of political economy 
pressures pulling in both directions, the pessimistic view that existing RTAs will 
definitely inhibit further trade liberalisation in general, and MTAs in particular, seems 
unwarranted.    
In conclusion, we note two possible scenarios for the future. In the first, the 
Doha round succeeds and the prospects for success in subsequent rounds looks good.   
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MTAs then remain the main vehicle for liberalising trade in goods and services and 
investment flows. One then has to ask if RTAs would inhibit further multilateral 
negotiations, or would be neutral in the process, or would stimulate further trade 
liberalization. Our analysis of these three possibilities suggests that there are effects 
operating within an FTA that will tend to have positive effects on the political 
economy of trade liberalisation and these could partially, fully, or more than fully 
offset the potential negative effects. If our optimistic view is correct, RTAs remain an 
important complement to the MTS. If the pessimists are correct, RTAs exert a drag on 
further MTAs, although we hasten to add that the case for this eventuality seems weak 
to us. In any case, with this scenario the successful conclusion to the Doha 
negotiations and a broad lowering of MFN tariffs  greatly reduces the scope for trade 
diversion from RTAs. If the margins of preference are low, the welfare costs of trade 
diversion, and benefits of trade creation, are likely to be small, at least when viewed 
from the classic Vinerian perspective. But viewed from a more modern perspective of 
imperfect competition, especially among oligopolies producing differentiated 
products, there still remain significant potential gains to be reaped both from 
specialisation in particular product lines to reap scale economies and from increased 
competitive pressures to innovate. (After all as Schumpeter long ago observed, 
increases in living standards over the long term come mainly from innovations in new 
products, processes and forms of organisation, rather than from increasing static 
efficiency, no matter how desirable the latter may be.)       
In a second scenario, the Doha negotiations remain blocked. More RTAs then 
become the second best alternative to doing nothing while the MTS negotiations are 
stalled. Again it matters how further RTAs affect the chances for the revival of 
negotiations for MTAs. Making what seems to us to be the conservative assumption 
that further RTAs are on balance neutral with respect to their influence on the 
negotiation of further MTAs, this makes the second best alternative of RTAs an 
excellent one. It should also be noted that the further proliferation of RTAs in this 
scenario may eventually spawn a movement for simplification by subsuming many of 
the overlapping  RTAs in a more general MTA. After all, the more that countries have 
RTAs with their major trading partners, the less they have to worry about negative 
effects from MTAs and the more they have to gain from removing the administrative 
costs associated with ROOs in multiple overlapping RTAs. Thus, over the long term 
run, the proliferation of RTAs that seems so messy in the short term could be the only 
realistic road to really embracing MTAs.      
Finally, we suggest that because the current wave of RTAs is embedded 
within a robust trading framework in the WTO, there are grounds for optimism that 
the process of competitive liberalisation in RTAs will lead eventually to further 
multilateral liberalisation.  
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